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Introduction
The growth of internet telephony or Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) services has led to questions by policymakers
and legislators over the regulation of VoIP. In this article,
the authors consider the extent to which VoIP services
are protected from an EU/US perspective and the concerns
arising from the current legislative framework, mainly
from privacy perspective. The second part considers VoIP
services in general. The third part examines the European
framework and in particular, the current categorisation of
VoIP services, before considering the privacy perspective,
taking into account the Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications 2002/58 and the general Data Protection
Directive 95/46. The fourth part will consider the US
framework in protecting the privacy of communications,
asserting that the federal courts and legislatures should act
to explicitly protect VoIP oral internet communications. The
final part will conclude by discussing the principal areas that
still need to be addressed.
What is VoIP?
In its broadest definition, VoIP can be described as the
‘‘conveyance of voice, fax and unrelated services publicly
or wholly over packet switched IP-based networks including
peer-to-peer VoIP and VoIP services connected to PSTN’’.1
This section presents a broad overview of the technology
involved in both internet voice and data transactions. It
discusses, in a non-technical manner, how VoIP transmits
voice communications over the internet.
VoIP is a technology by which oral communications
can be transferred from circuit-switched networks to or over
Internet Protocol networks, and vice versa. VoIP transforms
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standard oral telephone signals into compressed data packets
that are sent over the Internet Protocol. The audio signal
at this point is captured either by way of a microphone or
received from line input. This analogue representation is then
converted to a digital representation at the audio input device.
The resulting digital samples are copied into a memory buffer
in blocks of frame length. Here, a silence detector decides
whether the block is silence or a portion of speech. Prior
to transmission over the internet, the block itself is written
to a socket. Once this is completed, the communication is
transmitted to another VoIP terminal. This terminal parses
the header information and the block of audio is decoded
applying the same codec and the samples written into a
buffer. Once this step is complete, the block of samples is
copied from the buffer to the audio output device. The audio
output device makes the digital to analogue conversion and
outputs the signal. VoIP can be used with either a telephone
or a PC as the user terminal. This gives different modes of
operation: PC to PC, PC to telephone, telephone to PC and
telephone to telephone (via the internet), all VoIP protocols
are application layer protocols.
People have been aware of the potential for wiretapping,
but the public perceives such actions to be limited to corporate
espionage and criminal activities.2 To eavesdrop over the
switched telephone network there must be physical access to
the telephone line and access to some type of hardware device
that may or may not be very sophisticated.3 The equipment
or software needed is much more sophisticated, but well
2 J Fitzgerald, ‘‘Team to Tie Net Phone Hackers; Industry Aims to
Stop Scams before they Start’’, Boston Herald, April 26, 2005, p.31.
3 VoIP is a solid technology; however, it requires government reg-
ulation to ensure a certain level of product reliability and safety
for the consumer. Y. Nishiyama, ‘‘Vulnerabilities in Electronic Com-
merce Communication: IM & VoIP’’, World Bank, Washington D.C.
(2003). Up until today security issues in the data and voice worlds
have been seen to be completely separate by the users. With the
advent of VoIP, users are now exposed to the risks of sending data
over the internet while simultaneously having the expectation that
telephone conversations are between the parties involved. VoIP is
vulnerable because convergent technologies lead to weakness from
multiple points. In addition, VoIP must address the security holes
in cell-phones that arise from the transport mechanisms used when
mobile phones are in use. Adjoining these problems is the reality
that cell tracker tools have evolved and people can eavesdrop with
much greater ease on cellular transmission. Also, hackers can inter-
cept data with greater ease then before when the data travels in soft
zones (unprotected) between legitimate users and cell towers. Mar-
tius Miettinen, ‘‘IT-Security in the Automobile Domain’’, Lehrstuhl
fu¨r Kommunikationssicherheit, Ruhr University at Bochum
(Germany), at http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/mjmietti/seminaariS03/
automobilesecurity.pdf [Accessed June 11, 2009]. Thus transmit-
ting information in digital form raises new vulnerabilities, and a
digital device can be used either for fiscal or and privacy violations.
Also, the VoIP systems run on vulnerable software, so the systems
must contend with all of these possible holes.
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within the reach of a 16-year-old hacker that has access to
e-Bay or the Web. Data sniffing tools are readily available
and these tools will soon be enhanced to become aware of
the new VoIP protocols broadening access the accessibility to
wiretapping tools.4 Data sniffing tools are used primarily to
steal or transmit end-user data from end-users’ machines with
or without their knowledge.5 While in an office environment
VoIP traffic travels over a data network that is used by all
of the regular users of the corporate Local Area Network
(LAN), any or all of the conversations traversing a network
could theoretically be compromised by anyone with a regular
connection on the network.6 Consequently, VoIP packets
could be identified and stored for re-assembly to be played
back at a later time.7 The idea that only internet traffic is at
risk is simply wrong.8 Privacy for oral traffic could be vastly
enhanced by the use of encryption.9
European framework for the protection of
VoIP services
New regulatory framework
At a European level, the protection of VoIP services is
broadly covered under the new regulatory framework (NRF)
for electronic communications, which was adopted in April
2002 and came into effect on July 2003. The NRF was
introduced after a Commission’s Communication review back
in 1999,10 which was principally concerned with reforming
the telecommunications sector.
The NRF comprises five Directives: the Framework
Directive 2002/2111; Authorisation Directive 2002/2012;
4 J. Daniels, ‘‘Scumware.biz Educates About Dangers of
Adware/Scumware’’ (2004) 5 Computer Security Update 2.
5 P.J. Bruening and M. Stephen, ‘‘Spyware: Technologies, Issues,
and Policy Proposals’’ (2004) 7(9) J. Internet L. 3. Advertisers can
use these tools to identify what sites end-users have visited and
deliver targeted ads to the end-user’s computer. For example, if a
user visits a Florida cruise site followed by a later visit to a golfing
site, advertising using data sniffing tools will serve advertisements
to the end-user’s computer about golf course vacations in Florida.
Data sniffing tools encompass cookie technology such as Spyware,
adware.
6 D.J. Long, ‘‘The Lazy Person’s Guide to Voice Telephony—Part
II’’ (Spring 2004) CHIPS 43. Furthermore, with the onset of
widespread adoption of wireless technologies, attempts to intercept
communications are likely to grow.
7 A.J. Singer, ‘‘Debate over Voice-Over Internet Protocol Benefits:
Cost-Effectiveness, Security Concerns at Heart of Uncertainty’’, San
Diego Business Journal, Vol.51, December 17, 2001.
8 I. Shepherd, ‘‘VoIP: The Maturity of Internet Telephony
Technology Opens up Network Safety Concerns Voice over IP:
Finding a Balance between Flexible Access and Risk of External
Attack’’, Computer Weekly (Networks 34), April 19, 2005.
9 P. Bednarz (President and CEO, Netergy Microelectronics Inc.,
Santa Clara, Calif.), Communications Design Conference, ‘‘Security
Considerations at Forefront of VoIP Design’’, Electronic Engineering
Times, September 23, 2002, p.63 (adding word encryption and
decryption are CPU intensive and take time. If the overall latency
of a VoIP call is greater than approximately 250 milliseconds, the
quality of the call will noticeably be affected).
10 Commission Communication towards a new framework for
Electronic Communications infrastructure and associated services:
1999 Communications Review, COM(1999) 539, November 10,
1999.
11 Directive 2002/21 on a common regulatory framework for
electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ
L108/33.
12 Directive 2002/20 on the authorization of electronic communi-
cations networks and services [2002] OJ L108/21.
Access and Interconnection Directive 2002/1913; Universal
Service Directive 2002/2214; and the Directive on Privacy
and Electronic Communications 2002/58.15 The Framework
Directive sets out the main principles and objectives
underpinning the EU regulatory policy on the provision of
electronic communications services and networks, including
the role of the National Regulatory Authority (NRA).
The Access and Interconnection Directive deals with the
harmonisation of the linking of networks between operators
of public communications services.
The Universal Services Directive is important because it
principally deals with minimum set of services to be made
available to end-users including PATS services (described
below); network integrity, directory inquiry services; public
payphones; and special measures for disabled users.16
The Authorisation Directive establishes a legal framework
for Member States on general authorisation17 and applies to
the authorisation of all public and private electronic communi-
cations networks18 and electronic communications services19
(art.1(2)). By covering all electronic communications net-
works and services whether provided public or not, the
Directive applies to both categories providers so that they
can benefit from ‘‘objective, transparent, non-discriminatory
and proportionate rights, conditions and procedures’’ (Recital
4).
In a report dated 2004,20 the authors took the view
that the following issues needed to be addressed. These
were the current categorisation of VoIP as PATS; location
independence; emergency access; and network integrity.
Given the scope of this article, the discussion will centre
on the current categorisation of VoIP from a US and European
perspective.
Classification of VoIP providers
In brief, the regulation of VoIP in Europe is slightly complex21
because there is no consensus over the categorisation of VoIP
AQ1
13 Directive 2002/19 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic
communications networks and associated facilities [2002] OJ
L108/7.
14 Directive 2002/22 on universal service and users’ rights relating
to electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ
L108/7.
15 Directive 2002/58 concerning the protection of personal data
and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications
sector [2002] OJ L 201/37.
16 European• Commission, Universal Service, at http://europa.eu
[Accessed June 11, 2009].
17 European Commission, Regulating market access, at
http://europa.eu [Accessed June 11, 2009].
18 ‘‘Electronic communications networks’’ are defined under
art..2(a) of the Framework Directive 2002/21 as those ‘‘transmis-
sion systems, and where applicable switching and routing equipment
and other resources which permit the conveyance of signals by wire,
by radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic means, including
satellite networks (circuit- and packet-switched, including inter-
net) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable systems to
the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting sig-
nals, networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable
television networks, irrespective of the information they convey’’.
19 The definition of ‘‘electronic communications services’’ is
provided under the Framework Directive 2002/21. The definition
is covered above in the article.
20 European Commission, IP voice and associated convergent
voices, at http://europa.eu [Accessed June 11, 2009].
21 D. Bach and J. Sallet., ‘‘The challenges of classification: emerging
VOIP regulation in Europe and the United States’’, First Monday,
at http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10 7/bach/ [Accessed
June 11, 2009].
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services. The Commission takes a ‘‘light touch’’ approach to
VoIP regulation. Whether VoIP service is regulated would
depend on whether a VoIP service is considered as an
electronic communication service (ECS) or a publicly available
telecommunications service (PATS).
An ECS is defined under art.2(c) of the Framework
Directive22 as a ‘‘service normally provided for remuneration,
which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals
on electronic communications networks’’. Therefore a VoIP
service that provided a product such as a software program
to be run on personal computer with no ongoing provision
of service would fall outside the scope of the EU regulatory
framework.23
PATS or not?
A PATS is defined under art.2(c) of the Universal Services
Directive24 as a ‘‘service available to the public for originating
and receiving national and international calls and access
to emergency services through a number or numbers in a
national or international telephone numbering plan’’.
The classification of a VoIP provider as PATS means that
the criteria laid down under the Universal Services Directive
would apply. However, not all VoIP providers would be
classified as PATS because some providers may not give
access to emergency services as required under the definition.
Therefore the categorisation of VoIP providers as PATS is
not wholly conclusive. In response to a consultation paper
on the treatment of Voice over Internet Protocol25 by the
European Commission, the EuroISPA26 made known their
view the need for legal certainty regarding the rights and
obligation of the VoIP service providers. In particular, they
added that VoIP providers should not be classed as a PATS
provider on the basis of certain technical parameters. They
took the view that a VoIP provider should be categorised
as a PATS provider if its service was accessed from the
demand side (i.e. the customer) as a direct substitute for their
traditional voice telephony service. Arguably, the demand for
VoIP services has not reached the point where it has replaced
the traditional telephony service,27 but the lack of legal
certainty in this area does raise significant questions about
the extent to which VoIP providers should provide access to
emergency services and the like. In a recent decision by the
22 Directive 2002/21 on a common regulatory framework for
electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ
L108/33.
23 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘‘The treatment of Voice
over Internet Protocol under the EU Regulatory Framework, at
http://europa.eu [Accessed June 11, 2009].
24 Directive 2002/22 on universal service and users’ rights relating
to electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ
L108/7.
25 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘‘The treatment of Voice
over Internet Protocol under the EU Regulatory Framework’’, at
http://europa.eu [Accessed June 11, 2009].
26 EuroISPA. DG INFSO Information and Consultation Document:
The Treatment of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) under
the EU Regulatory Framework: response from the EuroISPA, at
http://europa.eu [Accessed June 11, 2009].
27 In the last presentation by Mattila on VoIP market trends, it was
estimated in September 2003 that there were less than 200,000
VoIP users worldwide whilst there were less than 20,000 VoIP users
in Europe. However, the growing number of broadband internet
access is likely to accelerate the use of VoIP services. O. Mattila,
‘‘Voice over IP (VoIP)—background and regulatory aspects’’,
at http://erg.eu.int/doc/publications/consult accounting sep/
erg 0422 voip discussion note.ppt [Accessed June 11, 2009].
Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority,28 Ficora held
that TeliaSonera VoIP (Sonera Puhekaista) service should be
classified as a PATS service on the basis that it was available
to the public; users originate and receive national and
international calls; there was access to emergency services
and the service was available through the Finnish numbering
plan. The TeliaSonera’s VoIP Service was offered only to their
broadband users and was offered as a substitute for PSTN
connection. The implications arising from Ficora’s decision
was that the TeliaSonera VoIP Service had to comply with
the obligations set for PATS laid down under the Finnish
regulations which included making available to their users,
access to the international calls using the access code 00;
availability by users to access the emergency call number
112 and other special emergency number free of charge; call
barring service at the request of the user free of charge and
the provision of itemised bills free of charge to the user.
Ofcom, the United Kingdom’s NRA, has used the same
criterion as the Universal Services Directive by holding the
view that a provider qualifies as PATS if all the following
criteria were satisfied. Namely, a provider would need to show
that it was a service available to the public; for originating
and receiving national and international calls and provided
access to emergency services through a number or numbers
in a national or international telephone numbering plan.29
What this means is that a VoIP provider based in the United
Kingdom, which does not meet all the criteria described above
would not be considered as PATS.
While it is clear what the criterion is to qualify as PATS,
it is unclear what the obligations are for VoIP providers that
do not qualify as PATS status. Certainly, non-PATS providers
such as peer-to-peer VoIP providers would not have to fulfil
the obligations as required under the Universal Services
Directive; however, some VoIP providers may constitute
an ECS as defined under the Framework Directive or the
equivalent national legislation and therefore will be required
to comply with the obligations laid down under the NRF.
More specifically, a provider would have to adhere to
the Authorisation Directive because it applies to ECS and the
Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 2002/58
(DPEC), the latter protects the privacy of communications in
the electronic communications sector. The DPEC replaces the
Telecommunications Directive 97/66 by dealing with the
processing of personal data in the context of the electronic
communications sector. It complements the general Data
Protection Directive 95/46 (which regulates the processing
of personal data for non-public communications) by dealing
with the regulation of personal data in the context of
the electronic communications sector. For a VoIP provider,
they would, as with any other organisation or individual
that collected personal information, be required to adhere
with the general Data Protection Directive 95/46 (DPD)
or corresponding national legislation. The Data Protection
Directive was passed to harmonise the data protection laws
within the European Union30 and imposes certain obligations
on organisations or individuals (‘‘data controllers’’31) that
AQ228 Ficora, Decision of• the Finnish Communications Regulatory
Authority on compliance with law of the Sonera Puhekaista Service,
at http://www.ficora.fi/englanti/document/SoneraPuhekaista.pdf .
29 Ofcom, ‘‘Regulation of VoIP Services’’, at http://www.ofcom.org.
uk/consult/condocs/voipregulation/voipregulation.pdf [Accessed
June 11, 2009].
30 For a background history into data protection laws in Europe,
see L.A. Bygrave, Data protection law: approaching its rationale,
logic and limits (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002).
31 Data controllers are defined under art.2(d) of the DPD as the
‘‘natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body
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process personal information to comply with the data
protection principles as laid down under art.6 of the DPD
and corresponding national laws.32
Individuals whose personal information is collected by
the data controllers are entitled to have a right to know what
information is held about them, including information on the
purposes of such processing and recipients or categories of
recipients of such data (art.10 of the DPD). Furthermore, data
controllers are required to implement appropriate technical
and organisational measures to ensure confidentiality and
security with regard to the processing of personal data
(art.17 of the DPD). For the VoIP provider, the privacy of
communications is important for users and the DPD places
obligations on anybody that collects personal information
to take technical and organisational security measures that
are appropriate to the risks presented by the processing.
Subject to the exemption under art.23(2)33 of the DPD, any
breach resulting from an unlawful processing of personal
data enables the user to receive some form of compensation
(art.23).
Application of the Directive on Privacy and
Electronic Communications 2002/58
The question that arises is what provisions apply to VoIP
providers under DPEC? First, the DPEC applies to the
‘‘processing of personal data in connection with the provision
of publicly available electronic communications services
in public communications networks in the Community’’
(emphasis added). Therefore private networks are excluded
within the remit of the DPEC.34 Although there have been no
legal cases in Europe on this, it could be argued that peer-to-
peer VoIP service that is not provided over a public network
but through an intranet system could fall outside the scope of
the DPEC. This does not mean that the general DPD would not
apply, but that the DPEC has limited its application to public
communications networks.35 The distinction drawn under
the DPEC between private and public networks is unfortunate
and the Article 29 Working Party (an advisory body set up
under the DPD to examine data protection issues and provide
opinions, make recommendations relating to data protection
matters within the European Union) has not been slow to
respond.
This is regrettable because private networks are gaining an
increasing importance in every day life and communications
of citizens, for example in the context of their work, and
the risks to privacy that such networks are raising are
which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data’’.
32 European Commission, First report on the implementation of the
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, at http://ec.europa.eu/justice
home/fsj/privacy/lawreport/report en.htm [Accessed June 11,
2009], and PRIVIREAL, Data Protection—countries http://www.
privireal.org/content/dp/countries.php [Accessed June 11, 2009].
33 DPD art.23(2) provides that ‘‘the controller may be exempted
from this liability [under the DPD], in whole or in part, if he proves
that he is not responsible for the event giving rise to the damage’’.
34 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 7/2000 on the European
Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council concerning the processing of personal data and
the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector,
12 July 12, 2000, COM(2000) 385, at http://europa.eu [Accessed
June 11, 2009].
35 DPD art.3 covers ‘‘the processing of personal data wholly or
partly by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by
automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing system
or are intended to form part of a filing system’’.
accordingly increasing and becoming more specific (e.g.
monitoring of employee behaviour by means of traffic data,
lack of confidentiality of communications).
Legal obligations of VoIP providers under
DPEC
For VoIP providers of publicly available networks, the
following provisions that apply (not an exhaustive list) are
summarised below.
Article 5 on the confidentiality of communications
Member States of the European Union are required to prohibit
the ‘listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of interception
or surveillance of communications and the related traffic data
by persons other than users, without the consent of the
users concerned, except when legally authorised to do so in
accordance with art.15(1) of the DPEC.
Article 6 on traffic data
Traffic data relating to subscribers and users would need
to be erased or made anonymous when it is no longer
needed for transmission of the communication. In the case
of marketing electronic communications services or for the
provision of value added services,36 a VoIP provider could
continue to process traffic data relating to subscribers/users
if the subscriber/user has consented. The user/subscriber can
withdraw his/her consent at any time (art.6(3) of the DPEC).
Article 4 on technical and organisational measures
The providers of a publicly available ECS would need to
take appropriate technical and organisational measures to
safeguard the security of their services. Examples could
include measures protecting users from viruses or denial-of-
services attacks.37 Article 4(2), however, enables providers
of publicly available ECS to inform subscribers of particular
risks to breaches of security of the network and ‘‘where the
risk lies outside the scope of the measures to be taken by the
service provider, of any possible remedies’’.
In the context of VoIP, one of the main questions
to consider is the security of communications when users
connect their ‘‘terminals’’ (be it PDAs or handheld PCs) to
a public telephone network such as a WIFI hotspot. Open
networks are not secure and therefore, users should generally
use some form of encryption software (WEP for example)
to protect the privacy of their communications between their
laptop and the WIFI hotspot. However, if personal information
is being uploaded or downloaded on a user’s laptop, then
the question is to what extent is a provider of the public
electronic communications required to ensure the privacy of
communications of a user’s laptop when the user connects to
the provider’s WIFI hotspot?38 Article 4 of the DPEC requires
a provider of a publicly available ECS to take appropriate
36 This is a new provision introduced under DPEC. Article 2(g)
defines a ‘‘value added service’’ as ‘‘service which requires the
processing of traffic data or location data other than traffic data
beyond what is necessary for the transmission of a communication
or the billing thereof’’. Examples of value added service include
route guidance, traffic information, weather forecasts and tourist
information that could be provided to a user or subscriber (Recital
18 of the DPEC).
37 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘‘The treatment of Voice
over Internet Protocol under the EU Regulatory Framework’’, at
http://europa.eu [Accessed June 11, 2009].
38 Compliance and Privacy, ‘‘Wi-Fi: Are you broadcasting personal
data?’’, at http://www.complianceandprivacy.com/News-Wi-Fi-
broadcast-insanity.asp [Accessed June 11, 2009].
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technical and organisational measures to safeguard security
of its services but this provision should also be read in the
light of art.17 of the Data Protection Directive 95/46, which
requires that:
‘‘. . . data controllers implement appropriate technical and
organizational measures to protect personal data against
accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration,
unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular where the
processing involves the transmission of data over a network
and against all other unlawful forms of processing’’.
Arguably, a user could also be regarded as a data controller39
within the DPD if he or she processes personal data on his/her
laptop and therefore, the privacy of communications is not
solely the responsibility of the network or VoIP provider.
There are principally two areas of concern that need to be
discussed:
1. Privacy of communications: first, defining the line
between VoIP services provided over a broadband
network that is operated by another internet service
provider and VoIP services where the VoIP provider has
control over the broadband network. The distinction
is important because in the former case, it could be
contended that network integrity should be maintained
by the internet service provider while the VoIP
provider would need to ensure the confidentiality of
communications between users over this network. In
the latter example, it could easily be identified that
the VoIP provider has control over the network and
thus, ensure the integrity of communications. Article
4(1) of DPEC, however, clearly provides that in
protecting network security, the provider of a publicly
available ECS may need to work with the provider of
the public communications network to achieve this.40
Therefore, preserving network integrity may have to be
accomplished jointly between an internet service provider
and a VoIP provider.41
2. Spam over internet telephony: a second area of
concern that is likely to arise is the possibility of
unsolicited phone calls (often referred to as spam over
internet telephony or SPIT) transmitted through VoIP.
Whether SPIT will become a prevalent concern as email
spam is not entirely clear, but in a recent consultation42
by OFCOM, some respondents have taken the view that
anti-SPIT mechanisms are being developed to deal with
39 The definition of a ‘‘data controller’’ under art.2(d) of the DPD is
broad to cover a ‘‘natural or legal person, public authority, agency
or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the
purposes and means of the processing of personal data . . .’’.
40 Article 4(1) reads as follows: ‘‘The provider of a publicly
available electronic communications service must take appropriate
technical and organisational measures to safeguard security of its
services, if necessary in conjunction with the provider of the public
communications network with respect to network security. Having
regard to the state of the art and the cost of their implementation,
these measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the
risk presented’’ (emphasis added).
41 In an Ofcom survey, some respondents have emphasised that no
VoIP service provider has control over all aspects of the network and
that a VoIP provider could only reasonably be expected to deliver
network integrity over the elements that it controls. For example
Internet Telephony Services Providers’ Association, ‘‘Regulation
of VoIP Services’’, May 10, 2006, at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/
consult/condocs/voipregulation/responses/itspa.pdf . [Accessed
June 11, 2009].
42 Ofcom, ‘‘Regulation of VoIP Services’’, at http://www.ofcom.
org.uk/consult/condocs/voipregulation/voipregulation.pdf
[Accessed June 11, 2009].
this type of problem.43 However, even though SPIT
mechanisms are being developed, arguably, the current
framework under the DPEC is more directed towards
the traditional public telephone switch network. For
example, the provision on unsolicited communications
under art.13(3) requires the prior consent of subscribers
in the context of automatic calling machines, fax and
electronic mail. The requirement of prior consent does not
necessarily apply to telephone marketing or unsolicited
calls to users through VoIP; the latter is covered
under art.13(3) of the DPEC. This provision enables
Member States to determine the measures for unsolicited
communications by means other than automated calling
machines, fax and email.44 A further point to add is that
there are lists45 which individuals can subscribe to if they
do not want to be contacted by marketing companies,
but presently no lists exist in the context of VoIP for
individuals who do not want to be contacted using VoIP.
While it should be noted that SPIT is still relatively new,
it is unclear how much of a risk this will be for users.46
Whether there should be at blacklist against potential
telemarketers in VoIP is another question, but some VoIP
providers such as Skype and Yahoo47 have facilities to
enable users to block certain callers. It remains to be
seen whether SPIT is likely to pose a significant risk for
users.
Article 9 on location data
In the case of location data,48 processing of such data relating
to users or subscribers is permitted with their consent or can
only be processed when this data is made anonymous or
in the case of providing a value added service,49 could only
be used with the consent of the users or subscribers. This
provision is probably more relevant when considering PDAs,
handheld PCs or even cell phones that uses VoIP services.
43 Internet Telephony Services Providers’ Association, ‘‘Regulation
of VoIP Services’’, at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/
voipregulation/responses/itspa.pdf [Accessed June 11, 2009].
44 Article 13(3) reads as follows: ‘‘Member States shall take
appropriate measures to ensure that, free of charge, unsolicited
communications for purposes of direct marketing, in cases other than
those referred to in paragraphs1 and 2 [of art.13], are not allowed
either without the consent of the subscribers concerned or in respect
of subscribers who do not wish to receive these communications,
the choice between these options to be determined by national
legislation.’’
45 The UK Telephone Preference System, at http://www.tpsonline.
org.uk/tps/ [Accessed June 11, 2009].
46 Bruce Schneier, ‘‘Combating spam’’, at http://www.schneier.
com/blog/archives/2005/05/combating spam.html [Accessed
June 11, 2009].
47 Yahoo, Regulation of VoIP services: statement and further consul-
tation, http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/voipregulation/
responses/yahoo.pdf [Accessed June 11, 2009].
48 This was a new provision introduced under the DPEC and is
defined under art.2(c) as ‘‘any data processed in an electronic
communications network, indicating the geographic position of the
terminal equipment of a user of a publicly available electronic
communications service’’. For example, a computer, mobile phone
or a personal digital assistant revealing the location of a user via
such equipment would thus qualify as ‘‘location data’’ under art.2(c)
DPEC.
49 A value added service is defined under art.2(g) of the DPEC
as ‘‘any service which requires the processing of traffic data or
location data other than traffic data beyond what is necessary for
the transmission of a communication or the billing thereof’’. Recital
18 of the DPEC gives examples of value added services, which may
‘‘consist of advice on least expensive tariff packages, route guidance,
traffic information, weather forecasts and tourist information’’.
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Article 15 on data retention
A controversial provision, which was subsequently approved
by the European Parliament. According to the latter part of
art.15(1), ‘‘Member States may, inter alia, adopt legislative
measures providing for the retention of data for a limited
period justified on the grounds laid down in this paragraph
[15(1)] . . .’’. This provision should be read in the light of
a recent Data Retentions Directive 2006/2450 which was
enacted to deal with the retention of certain data. Article 1(1)
of the Data Retentions Directive expressly provides the main
objective, namely to:
‘‘. . . harmonise Member States’ provisions concerning the
obligations of the providers of publicly available electronic
communications services or of public communications networks
with respect to the retention of certain data which are generated
or processed by them, in order to ensure that the data are
available for the purpose of the investigation, detection and
prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State
in its national law’’.
Data is stored between a minimum of six months to
two years.51 For internet telephony, Member States could
postpone the application of the retention of communications
data relating to internet telephony52 until March 2009.
The main categories of data that could be retained are
data necessary to trace and identify the source of a
communication53; data necessary to identify the destination
of a communication54; data necessary to identify the date,
time and duration of a communication55; data necessary
to identify the type of communication; data necessary to
identify users’ communication equipment or what purports
to be their equipment. As expressly stated under art.5(2)
50 Directive 2006/24 on the retention of data generated or processed
in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic
communications services or of public communications networks and
amending Directive 2002/58 [2006] OJ L105/54.
51 Article 6 of the Data Retentions Directive reads as follows:
‘‘Member States shall ensure that the categories of data specified in
Article 5 are retained for periods of not less than six months and not
more than two years from the date of the communication.’’
52 Article 15(3) of the Data Retentions Directive provides: ‘‘Until 15
March 2009, each Member State may postpone application of this
Directive to the retention of communications data relating to Internet
Access, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail. Any Member State
that intends to make use of this paragraph shall, upon adoption
of this Directive, notify the Council and the Commission to that
effect by way of a declaration. The declaration shall be published in
the Official Journal of the European Union.’’ Some Member States,
however, postponed the application of art.15(3) for a shorter period.
For example, Austria and Germany postponed the application of
the provision on the retention of communications data relating to
internet access, internet telephony and internet email for 18 months
after September 15, 2007.
53 Article 5(1)(a) of the DPEC. In the context of internet telephony,
this the user ID; the user ID and telephone number allocated to any
communication entering the public telephone network and the name
and the address of the subscriber or registered user to whom an
internet protocol address, user ID or telephone number was allocated
at the time of the communication (art.5(1)(a)(2) of the DPEC).
54 DPEC art.5(1)(b). In the context of internet telephony, this would
be the user ID or telephone number of the intended recipient(s) of
an internet telephony call and the name(s) and address(es) of
the subscriber(s) or registered user(s) and user ID of the intended
recipient of the communication (art.5(1)(b)(2) of the DPEC).
55 DPEC art.5(1)(c). In the context of internet telephony, this would
be the date and time of the log-in and log-off of the internet access
service, based on a certain time zone, together with the IP address,
whether dynamic or static, allocated by the internet access service
provider to a communication, and the user ID of the subscriber
or registered user; the date and time of the log-in and log-off of
the internet email service or internet telephony service, based on a
certain time zone (art.5(1)(c)(2) of the DPEC).
of the Data Retentions Directive, data revealing the content
of the communications are not covered.56 Although these
provisions expressly provide the need to trace the user, the
key difficulty that arises is tracing the origin of the calls that
are made. In an article on VoIP,57 Warren describes the main
problems with VoIP from a law enforcement perspective:
‘‘The problem with VoIP, from law enforcement perspective, is
that it does not travel through an exchange. There is no simple
way to catch the packets travelling over the internet, or even
to link the 12-digit internet ‘IP addresses’ between which a call
travels online to any two people. Wireless routers can generate
a one time IP address that can be pinpointed to the wireless
router, but—as in the case of a wireless hotspot—that will show
only that the call was made from that router.’’
Indeed, the problem of tracing calls is made more difficult with
the use of wireless phones, wireless-enabled smart phones
and PDAs that could make calls from any unlocked domestic
wireless access point. In the next section, the authors consider
the current legal position of the United States on the protection
of VoIP.
US legal framework
The United States’ use of VoIP telecommunication technolo-
gies is maturing and several of the issues discussed above
have not appeared as issues in the United States. In 1928, Jus-
tice Brandeis, in Olmstead v United States,58 anticipated that
technological advancement would enable the Government
to employ surveillance tools extending far beyond wiretap-
ping. In that dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis asserted that
Fourth Amendment protections must be interpreted broadly
to safeguard against new abuses that were not previously
envisioned. Thus Brandeis sought to protect the individ-
ual’s ‘‘right to be let alone’’ without regard to the different
technologies that might be employed by the Government
to compromise that right. Justice Brandeis’s forward-looking
focus on individuals’ underlying privacy interests presents a
more compelling perspective than the premise of the Wiretap
Act as currently applied by the courts.
Since Katz v United States,59 courts have routinely
forbidden third parties from tapping or monitoring oral
communications. However, they just as routinely permit
businesses to track, store and sell data packets transmitted
in the same way with the implied or explicit consent of
either party engaged in the transmission. The digital age
and its VoIP cause the distinction between voice and data
made in the law to become muddled in the digital age. With
the convergence of oral and data into a single transmission
medium, the courts, like computers, are unable to distinguish
between oral and data communications.60 The use of the VoIP
and analogous technologies has made this legal distinction
impossible to uphold because oral and data communications
now travel over the same wires simultaneously, encapsulated
in digital data packets.
56 Recital 13 of the Data Retentions Directive provides that the
Directive applies to ‘‘data generated or processed as a consequence
of a communication or a communication service and does not relate
to data that are the content of the information communicated . . .’’.
57 P. Warren, ‘‘Lifting the veil on internet voices’’, Technology
Guardian, July 27, 2006, p.1.
58 Olmstead v United States 277 U.S. 438, 466, 472–74, 478
(1928) (Brandeis J. dissenting),
59 Katz v United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
60 D.B. Garrie, M.J. Armstrong and D.P. Harris, ‘‘Voice Over Internet
Protocol and the Wiretap Act: Is Your Conversation Protected?’’
(2005) 29 Seattle Univ. L. Rev. 97.
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Telephone communications are protected from
governmental privacy invasions
The courts have found telephone communications protected
from governmental privacy invasions in two principal ways.61
First, parties to a voice conversation are entitled to a
‘‘reasonable expectation of privacy’’ under the Supreme
Court opinion of Katz v United States.62 Secondly, the
Federal Wiretap Act of 1968 prevents unauthorised third-
party interceptions of telephone communications, unless the
interceptor is in possession of a court order or either of the
involved parties in the communication have provided their
consent.63 The Katz opinion explains the rationale behind
the Supreme Court’s oft-quoted statement that the Fourth
Amendment ‘‘protects people, not places’’,64 and concludes
that an entity’s reasonable expectation of privacy must be
protected from government searches.65 The Federal Wiretap
Act was Congress’s response to the Katz opinion and was an
attempt to prevent electronic surveillance of oral telephone
communications without a court order.66
The Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Katz eliminated
the idea that property rights governed a person’s right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.67 Katz
stands for the proposition that an individual can control
which of his actions and information is accessible by
the public,68 and what remains private and protected by
the Fourth Amendment.69 The Katz doctrine of Fourth
Amendment protections has a twofold requirement: first,
a person must exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy,
and secondly, that expectation must be one that society
is prepared to recognise as reasonable.70 While the courts
have read Katz narrowly in recent years,71 because the
Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections only insulate
individuals from governmental privacy encroachments72
the Wiretap Act is the main cause of action protecting
telephone communicants from non-governmental third-
party interceptors.73 Telephone communicants can obtain
redress under the Wiretap Act for unauthorised third-
party interceptions of telephone communications unless the
interceptor has a court order74 or the consent of either party
involved in the conversation.75
61 Frierson v Goetz 227 F. Supp. 2d 889, 896–897 (M.D. Tenn.
2002).
62 Katz 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
63 18 USC §§2510–2521 (2004).
64 Katz 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
65 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (government’s actions ‘‘violated the
privacy upon which [petitioner] justifiably relied’’ and thus triggered
Fourth Amendment protections).
66 United States v Andonian 735 F. Supp. 1469, 1471 (C.D. Cal.
1990).
67 Katz 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
68 Katz 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (‘‘What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he Seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.’’).
69 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
70 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan J. concurring).
71 Orin S. Kerr, ‘‘The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution’’ (2004) 102 Mich.
L. Rev. 801, 852.
72 Skinner v Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n 489 U.S. 602, 614
(1989); Schmerber v California 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
73 Wiretap Act 18 USC §§2510–2521 (2004).
74 Wiretap Act 18 USC §§2511(2)(a)(ii)(A) (2004).
75 Wiretap Act 18 USC §§2511(2)(d) (2004).
In summary, Title III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act (Wiretap Act)76 initially
afforded extensive protection to wire communications, oral
communications were protected only when there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy.77 Because the legislation
covered both face-to-face oral communications and traditional
point-to-point wired communications, courts were faced with
myriad interpretive difficulties.78 To correct the problems with
Title III, Congress amended the Wiretap Act by passing the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).79
Congress designed the ECPA to prohibit the intentional
interception of oral, wire, and electronic communications.80
Because Congress was concerned with advancements in
electronic technology that would be capable of defeating
any privacy expectations,81 the ECPA enacted a strict set of
standards for the interception of oral, wire, and electronic
communications.82 Congress further expanded the protection
of wireless communication by passing the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA),
which extended Title III to the radio portions of cellular
and cordless phones.83 In the wake of September 11, 2001,
Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act).84 The Patriot
Act contained a number of important changes to Title III that
expanded the government’s ability to conduct surveillance,
but it is ambiguous on what protections are extended to VoIP
oral communications.
Presently, in the existing judicial environment in the
United States, it is not clear whether VoIP communica-
tions will receive similar judicial treatment as oral telephone
communications85 or whether they will be treated as internet
based electronic communications. The Wiretap Act’s protec-
tive provisions apply equally to oral, wire, and electronic
communications.86 In practice, however, courts have per-
mitted the interception of internet electronic communications
under the Wiretap Act more than interceptions of oral tele-
phone communications because (1) corporate web portals
using clickstream technology frequently consent to the inter-
ception of end-user data for purposes of data mining, whereas
telephone users rarely consent to third-party interceptions of
76 Wiretap Act, Pub. L. No.90-351, Tit. III, §802, 82 Stat. 212
(1968).
77 United States v McKinnon 985 F. 2d 525, 527 (11th Cir. 1993)
(stating that Congress drafted the definition of ‘‘oral communication’’
to reflect the Supreme Court’s standards for determining when a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists).
78 Edwards v Bardwell 632 F. Supp. 584, 589 (M.D. La.), aff’d, 808
F. 2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986) (treating radio telephone communications
as oral communications and holding that because communications
through cellular devices could easily be intercepted, the requisite
reasonable expectation of privacy did not exist).
79 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.99-
508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 18 USC §§2510-2521,
2701–S2710, 3117, 3121–3126 (1986)).
80 S. Rep. No.99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3555–3557.
81 S. Rep. No.99-541 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3555.
82 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 USC §2518
(2004).
83 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994
(CALEA), Pub. L. No.103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (amending
18 USC § 2510 (2004)).
84 Patriot Act, Pub. L. No.107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
85 Katz 389 U.S. 347, 351–352 (1967).
86 Bartnicki v Vopper 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) (‘‘The basic
purpose of the Title III is to protect the privacy of wire ldots and oral
communications’’) (quoting S. REP. No.90-1097, at 66 (1968)).
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telephone conversations87; (2) end-users are more likely to
consent to interceptions of internet electronic communica-
tions in return for increased online functionality than they
are when engaging in traditional telephone conversations88;
and (3) internet electronic communications are more likely
to be stored on an end-user’s computer, making them fair
game for third-party interceptors, since the Wiretap Act only
applies to communications intercepted contemporaneously
with transmission.89 Therefore the US framework is currently
in a state of flux and is not able to disambiguate the existing
statutory language with regards to VoIP oral communication
technologies.
Conclusion
As identified in the article, the regulatory framework for VoIP
services both in the EU and the United States is beginning to
emerge.
The European framework should be regarded as an
important milestone for regulating and clarifying the provision
of VoIP services; yet major questions still arise over the
current classification of VoIP services, such that not all
VoIP providers would be considered PATS and therefore the
obligation to PATS providers would not apply to non-PATS
VoIP providers such as peer-to-peer VoIP providers. Thus
there is no uniformity in the legal obligations that exist for
VoIP providers. As for the privacy of communications, this
is principally covered under the DPD and DPEC. The main
areas that need to be addressed (albeit at a European level
87 Chance v Avenue A, Inc 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1162 (W.D.
Wash. 2001).
88 A telephone communicant need not give express consent to
authorise an interception under the Wiretap Act; such consent can
be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. United States v
Amen 831 F. 2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that consent can
be inferred where circumstances indicate that a party knowingly
agreed to surveillance), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988).
However, inferring consent under the Wiretap Act for a telephone
communication requires the party to have knowledge or notification,
without which consent cannot be implied. Re State Police Litigation
888 F. Supp. 1235, 1266 (D. Conn. 1995) (holding that the
plaintiff’s claim under the Wiretap Act established sufficient evidence
of an absence of either knowledge or notification to prevent the
court from implying consent to the interception of a telephone
communication).
89 Konop v Hawaiian Airlines, Inc 302 F.• 3d 868, 878 (9th
AQ3
Cir. 2002) (holding that for a website to be ‘‘intercepted’’ in
violation of the Wiretap Act, it must be acquired during trans-
mission, not while it is in electronic storage). VoIP transmits
in real time, offering comparable services to the traditional tele-
phone. Philip Carden, ‘‘Network Design Manual: Building Voice over
IP, Network Computing’’, at http://www.networkcomputing.com/
netdesign/1109voipfull.html [Accessed June 11, 2009]. As with
telephone communications, VoIP interceptors will usually be inter-
cepting the communications contemporaneously with transmission.
N. Borisov, I. Goldberg and D. Wagner, ‘‘Intercepting Mobile
Communications: The Insecurity of 802.11’’, Seventh Annual Inter-
national Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, (July
2001); see also N. Borisov, I. Goldberg and D. Wagner, ‘‘Security of
the WEP Algorithm’’, at http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/
wep-faq.htm. Unlike telephone communications, VoIP communica-
tions can be intercepted prior to post transmission while stored or
cached on servers or end-users’ computers; ‘‘FBI Protests VoIP
Approach’’, January 9, 2004, at http://www.lightreading.com/
document.asp?site-lightreading&doc id45695 [Accessed June 11,
2009]. Possibly, the courts will hold that such interceptions do not
violate the Wiretap Act because the communications were not inter-
cepted contemporaneously with transmission. In some situations,
however, these VoIP interceptions may be prohibited by the Stored
Communications Act, 18 USC §2701 (2004), or the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, 18 USC §1030 (2004).
by policymakers) is the public/private network distinction
drawn under the DPEC; the preservation of network integrity
between a broadband service provider and the internet service
provider as covered under art.4 of the DPEC; spam over
internet telephony, and tracing the origin of the caller.
While the higher expectation of privacy afforded to
non-internet oral communications by the US Constitution
and the Wiretap Act’s prohibition of unauthorised third-party
interceptions of oral telephone and electronic communica-
tions, neither the US federal courts nor legislatures have acted
to explicitly protect VoIP oral internet communications90; in
fact, as technology is evolving with respect to VoIP and oral
internet communications it is becoming progressively greyer
and complex in both arenas.
In order to ensure that oral communications utilising VoIP
technology will receive the same treatment and protection
under the law as their non-VoIP oral communication
counterparts enjoy, the courts and the legislature must
act. They must either explicitly recognise the legislative
privacy distinction between digital data and other oral, wire
and electronic communications irrespective of the issue of
consent91 or the courts must halt all use of data mining
technology and wait for Congress to deliver a legislative
solution. A Congressional amendment would provide courts a
new legal framework in which to analyse VoIP claims brought
under the Wiretap Act, enabling them to differentiate between
data transmissions and other oral, data, and electronic
transmissions. Without Congressional action and court
application, VoIP technology remains at risk of unauthorised
access and mining, which threatens the free communication
of us all. The other possible solution, which is beginning
to occur already, is for each state to act independently of
the Federal Government; however, given the complex legal
issues this approach is neither ideal nor likely to be effective
in remedying VoIP communications in the United States.
90 Garrie, Armstrong and Harris, ‘‘Voice Over Internet Protocol and
the Wiretap Act: Is Your Conversation Protected?’’ (2005) 29 Seattle
Univ. L. Rev. 97.
91 Cases such as Re DoubleClick 154 F. Supp. 2d 497; Re Intuit
138 F. Supp. 2d 1272; Re Toys R Us, No.00-CV-2746, 2001 WL
34517252, at *1; Chance 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153.
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